Abstract-Cutting a cake is a metaphor for the problem of dividing a resource (cake) among several agents. The problem becomes non-trivial when the agents have different valuations for different parts of the cake (i.e. one agent may like chocolate while the other may like cream). A fair division of the cake is one that takes into account the individual valuations of agents and partitions the cake based on some fairness criterion. Fair division may be accomplished in a distributed or centralized way. Due to its natural and practical appeal, it has been a subject of study in economics under the topic of "Fair Division". To best of our knowledge the role of partial information in fair division has not been studied so far from an information theoretic perspective. In this paper we study two important algorithms in fair division, namely "divide and choose" and "adjusted winner" for the case of two agents. We quantify the benefit of negotiation in the divide and choose algorithm, and its use in tricking the adjusted winner algorithm. Lastly we consider a centralized algorithm for maximizing the overall welfare of the agents under the Nash collective utility function (CUF). This corresponds to a clustering problem. Drawing a conceptual link between this problem and the portfolio selection problem in stock markets, we prove an upper bound on the increase of the Nash CUF for a clustering refinement.
I. INTRODUCTION
In many applications a number of parties are interested in possessing a limited resource, e.g. a set of goods or metaphorically a cake. Each party has his own valuation of different parts of the cake, and each has full, partial or no information about the valuation of the other parties. Finding a way to divide a cake fairly has attracted the attention of economists and mathematicians for a long time. Although information theory is developed for studying communication systems, it gives us tools to quantify information in other fields (such as fair-division) where partial information is of relevance. One of our non-trivial results is that in a certain division game between Alice and Bob where Bob is unwilling to let Alice spy on his information, if Bob learns that the spying rate of Alice exceeds a certain rate, he will become willing to share even more information. Thus, identifying when this happens can be of importance to Alice and Bob when they are designing the rules of the game.
Before trying to find a fair division, one must define the term "fairness". Several criteria of fairness have been introduced to judge the goodness of a division where none of which subsumes the others [1] . Here we will give a brief introduction to four of them. Assume that k denotes the number of parties.
• A division is said to be proportional if each party receives at least 1 k of the entire cake w.r.t. his own valuation.
• A division is said to be equitable if the piece of the cake each party obtains w.r.t. his own valuation is exactly equal to what the other parties receive (w.r.t. their own valuation).
• A division is said to be envy-free if no party believes that, w.r.t. his own valuation, the piece another party has received is more valuable than his own.
• A division is said to be efficient or Pareto optimal if it is not possible to find another division that increases the gain of every individual. In the literature of fair division, there are two major assumptions regarding the set of goods to be divided: the category of divisible goods where each good or item could be divided among parties, and the category of indivisible goods where each item should wholly be given to one party (e.g. a car or a laptop) [2] . Analyzing division of divisible goods is generally easier than that of indivisible goods. In the most generic scenario some of the items may be divisible, some indivisible and some partially divisible. We take care of this generic scenario by considering a set D of "admissible" divisions of the resource. Theoretically the set D is of size infinity if we have a divisible item in the resource (since we can cut that item in any proportion). Practically speaking, even divisible items can be cut up to a certain precision. Therefore for simplicity we assume that the set D is finite (unless stated otherwise).
The literature on fair division generally assumes that the division game is played just once, and that each party chooses an action that maximizes the value of the minimum piece that the action can guarantee. To make this problem amenable to information theoretic analysis, we are going to relax the traditional formulation of the problem by introducing notions that parallel the familiar concepts of block coding and vanishing probability of error (as compared to zero probability of error) in communication theory. We assume that i.i.d. repetitions of the game is played multiple times, and that the average gain of a party over the games can be guaranteed with high probability. Since we are relaxing the formulation, our bounds serve as upper bounds to the traditional one-shot problem. Therefore we are also implicitly addressing the traditional problem.
Any algorithm providing a fair division may satisfy one or some of the fairness conditions introduced above. From another point of view, fair division may be accomplished in a distributed or centralized way. In a distributed algorithm the individuals should divide the cake amongst themselves, while in a centralized one, an external referee divides the cake for them. In order to address these two categories, we have chosen two prominent algorithms from the field, Divide-and-Choose (DC) from the category of distributed algorithms and Adjusted Winner (AW) from the category of centralized algorithms.
The "I cut, you choose" or divide-and-choose (DC) procedure is a well-known and ancient algorithm for dividing a resource among two parties [1] . The story of dividing a land between Abram and Lot in the Hebrew Bible refers to this method. In this procedure, the first party (Alice) cuts the cake into two parts and the second party (Bob) chooses one of the pieces, leaving the other piece for the first party. Note that Bob has an advantage over Alice for he can choose the best piece and can possibly get even more than half of the total value he assigns to the cake. In other words, when Alice does not know anything about Bob's valuation, she should divide the cake into two parts which are equal with respect to her valuation, so that despite of Bob's choice, she gains at least half of the cake. However Bob achieves more than half of the cake since he is free to choose. Since each party can obtain at least half the cake, this method is proportional but not equitable [3] .
The "Adjusted Winner" (AW) algorithm was originally proposed by Brams and Taylor [1] . Assume that two parties, say Alice and Bob, want to divide a set of m divisible goods. Alice's valuation vector is denoted by a vector a = (a 1 , . . . , a m ) of m non-negative real numbers that add up to one. Similarly, Bob's valuation vector is denoted by b = (b 1 , . . . , b m ). We assume that the value of a piece of cake for each player is the sum of the portion of each item present in that piece times the value that player assigns to that item. In the Adjusted Winner algorithm Alice and Bob announce their valuations vectors to an external referee. The referee solves a set of equations to come up with a division of the items which is proportional, equitable, envy-free and efficient. Brams and Taylor showed that in the case of having two goods, i.e. m = 2, when one of the parties, say Alice, knows Bob's valuation while Bob is unaware of this, Alice can announce an untrue valuation in order to trick the procedure and gain more than what she is expected. See [1] , [2] , [4] for further reading on fair division.
To the best of our knowledge, the problem of fair division has only been analyzed when individuals do not know the valuation of others, or when they have complete information about the valuations; it is not analyzed in the case of partial information. To motivate this study, let us begin with the DC algorithm As we saw previously, the second party, Bob, has advantage in choosing the piece he likes more. One way to make the algorithm more fair is to provide Alice with partial information about Bob's valuation. For instance if there is an item that Alice likes a lot but Bob is indifferent to it -and Alice knows this -she can put all of it in the piece that she predicts Bob will not choose. To quantize the role of information in such scenarios, we need to find the gain of individuals as a function of the rate of communication between them. This leads to characterizing the achievable rate-gain region. The tradeoff between the disadvantage of being the cutter and the advantage of having information is most notably present in a seller-consumer scenario. A seller offers a good for a price, and the consumer can choose to buy the item or keep his money. This problem resembles the DC algorithm and our formulation (defined later) is general enough to cover it. Setting a price by the seller resembles cutting a cake, and the consumer's choice of buying the item is like picking one of the two pieces "item" or "his money". As discussed above this transaction scheme is naturally biased towards the chooser, i.e. the consumer. But the seller has generally more information about the consumer's needs than the consumer has about the true price of the item. The role of information in the bargaining dynamic is also colorful: the consumer hides how much he really needs the item while the seller hides how much the item is really worth.
The last part of this paper considers the role of information in optimizing the social welfare, another topic in fair division. In the literature of economics, a social welfare is a function that collects the utilities or gains of each individual in the society and returns a real value which reflects the overall welfare in the society. Philosophical utilitarianism suggests a division strategy that maximizes the overall happiness (or sum of the gains of the individuals). Thus, the rules of division here are not decided by selfish players but by an external judge (or by players who follow Rawls's veil of ignorance [5] ). Another measure for social welfare that cares not only about the overall happiness but also about its uniform distribution over the individuals (an egalitarian philosophy) is the Nash collective utility function (CUF). Nash CUF is defined to be product of the gains of the individuals [6] . Motivated by the role of Nash CUF in fair division in large societies, we formulate a problem and study it from an information theoretic perspective.
II. OVERVIEW OF OUR CONTRIBUTIONS
We begin by an overview of our main results. Rigorous statement of the results can be found in section III.
A. Divide-and-Choose
Just like the way it goes in the real life, it is quite reasonable to assume that the two parties wish to negotiate and gain information about each other's valuations and then start the procedure so that they can achieve a better cut. The type of questions that Alice might ask is "If I divide the cake in this way, would you pick the right piece?" Bob might answer "No, but if you put two more cherries in the right piece I would choose that," and so on. All of this could be modeled by assuming that Alice and Bob exchange bits in several rounds of communication. As such we begin by defining a multi-round interactive two-way communication in the divide-and-choose algorithm. We can completely characterize the rate-gain region for this problem. Fig. 1 illustrates a schematic of this model.
To illustrate the result let us consider the following simple example with a one-way communication from Bob to Alice: imagine the cake has two items, say cream and chocolate and the set of possible valuations is V = { , } where denotes complete interest in cream and no interest in chocolate, i.e. = (1, 0) while = (0, 1) denotes complete interest in chocolate. Assume the cake is half cream and half chocolate and the set of possible divisions is D = { , } where means dividing the cake so that in each piece we have half cream and half chocolate and means dividing the cake so that one piece is full cream and one is full chocolate. Assume 2012 IEEE Information Theory Workshop Fig. 1 . A schematic of the r round negotiate process . Alice and Bob begin by exchanging messages C 1 , C 2 , . . . , Cr following which Alice cuts the cake (chooses a D n action sequence), resulting in average gains of G A and G B .
that the joint distribution over valuations, p Alice,Bob (v A , v B ) is as p( , ) = p( , ) = 2/6 and p( , ) = p( , ) = 1/6.
Assume there exists a one-way communication link from Bob to Alice of rate R BA . The rate-gain region consists of triples (R BA , G A , G B ). For a fixed R, if we limit the communication rate to be bounded by R, i.e. R BA ≤ R, the set of achievable gain pairs (G A , G B ) form a region in R 2 which is illustrated in Fig. 2 for different values of R. Observe that the gain pairs (G A , G B ) = ( ) by using when Bob likes the item that she likes, and when Bob likes the other item. In the case of partial information when 0 < R < H(V B |V A ), the region of achievable gains expands as R increases, which is expected as one can always discard extra information.
In some complicated examples we observe that if Alice is selfish, Bob's gain as a function of Alice's amount of side information can behave strangely; e.g. it can first increase, then decrease and then increase again. See [7] .
B. Adjusted Winner
As discussed earlier Brams and Taylor showed that in the case of having two items, a dishonest party who has full information about the other party's valuation vector can trick the referee. We extend this to the case of partial information by assuming that Bob announces his valuation honestly while Alice uses the partial information she has gained by spying over Bob to trick the referee and announce an untrue valuation.
We find the trade off between the "spying rate" and Alice's "spying gain". We analyze this tradeoff in two possible cases: the first case is when the set of valuations is finite and Alice can spy any arbitrary function of Bob's valuation vector consistent with her spying rate. The assumption that the set of valuations is finite is a practical assumption since we can assume that the value assigned to an item by each individual is a real number with finite precision. Therefore the set of all valuation vectors is finite. We find the tradeoff in this case via a simple transformation from AW to DC.
In the second case, we assume that the number of items, m is equal to 2 and Alice's valuation is fixed, while Bob's valuation is uniformly distributed in an interval [b min , b max ] . Most importantly in this case we consider a particular (but practical) set of binary searching questions of the form "Is Bob's valuation on the first item less than a particular value α or more than that?" By asking such questions, at each step we divide the interval into two subintervals. We assume that Alice can ask R questions on average in each game, or totally nR questions. We derive upper bounds for the improvement of Alice's spying gain as a function of spying rate R.
C. Maximum Nash collective utility function
In this section we consider society with a government who wants to divide its several resources among the citizens. Each person assigns a value for each of the resources available to the government, which are known to the government. Maximizing the Nash CUF for this society implies a division policy for the government, specifying how much of each resource should be allocated to each individual. For practical reasons the government may want to divide the citizens into several clusters, say drivers, teachers, etc, and apply the same division strategy uniformly to all people from the same class. We consider the increase of Nash CUF for a clustering refinement and draw conceptual links between this problem and the portfolio selection problem in stock markets [8] . d, v A v B ) to denote the gain of Alice and Bob respectively in one game.
III. MAIN RESULTS

A. Divide and Choose
The following is the formal definition of the r-round communication discussed before and depicted in Fig.1 . The gains associated with this code are random variables
GB (Di, VA,i VB,i) .
Definition 3.
For a fix number of interactive negotiation, r, a (G A , G B , R AB , R BA ) rate gain tuple is said to be achievable if for any δ > 0 and N , there exists a (n, R AB , R BA ) code with n > N where the associated gainsG A andG B satisfy the following inequalities with probability at least 1 − δ:
Definition 4. The rate gain region for r-round communication is the closure of all achievable tuples (G
and is denoted by R(r). 
Theorem 1. The rate gain region for r-round communication is the closure of all rate gain tuples (G
Remark 1. The cardinality of F i 's can be bounded from above, making the region computable (see [7] ). Proof Outline: For achievability, we use the empirical coordination rate region derived by Yassee et al. in [9] . We take V n A and V n B , the valuations of Alice and Bob in n games, as the copies the two terminals have. By writing the rate region for the case where Alice wants to generate D n while Bob wants to generate a constant sequence, we can prove the achievability. The converse is proved by reducing the n-letter to one-letter. See [7] for the full proof. Remark 2. Having the full region of achievable rate-gains, we can explore the existence of different fairness criteria in presence of partial information (e.g. for examples like the one depicted in Fig. 2) . As discussed before, presence of a certain amount of side information can compensate for the disadvantage of being the cutter and make the game equitable. AW A (a, b) · a.
1) Finite valuation set and arbitrary spying questions:
Assume that the set of possible valuations is finite. Our result in DC can be used for deriving spying gain as a function of spying rate by using a transformation that takes Alice's announced valuationã as the division D in DC. The gain functions of the DC are taken to be equal to the gain functions of the AW as follows:
2) Interval valuation set and splitting spying questions: Assume m = 2 and use valuation number x as a shorthand for the valuation vector (x, 1 − x). Assume Bob's valuation number is uniformly distributed in [b min , b max ] and Alice can only ask spying questions of the type mentioned in Section II-B. Alice can ask nR questions totally, but she can choose how to divide them across the n repetitions of the game. 
The analytical expression of ∆ k (b 0 , . . . , b 2 k ) has a long and highly complicated formula in general even for the case of k = 1; computing the maximum over b 0 , . . . , b 2 k makes it more difficult to prove tight results. We manage to prove a general computable upper bound (Thm. 2) and a tight result in a special case (Thm. 3). 
in which,
Proof Outline: A main step in the proof is to show (by induction) that for all k ≥ 1 we have
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The differentiability of ∆ * 1 is used to show that∆ satisfies the following condition,
for b min ≤ x < t < y ≤ b max . And the proof continues from here. See [7] for the full proof. 
is the right subinterval, and so on. In each step we should choose the geometric mean of the two endpoints. See [7] for the full proof.
C. On Maximizing The Nash Collective Utility Function
Consider a society of population n. Assume that the valuation vectors of everyone in the society is known to the government.
Definition 7.
A k-clustering P is a partition of the society into k clusters P 1 , P 2 , ..., P k . The government uses a fixed division strategy b i for all people in class i with population n i . The Nash welfare for P, denoted by W P is equal to the maximum of Remark 3. If we define the distance between two non-negative vectors v and w by − log(v · w), we can reexpress the problem of finding an optimal k-clustering as an unsupervised clustering of the valuation vectors of the whole society into k clusters. Vectors b i will be the centers which need to satisfy
Consider an arbitrary k-clustering P. Clustering P is not necessarily optimal since the government may want to classify people according to their profession for simplicity. We create a refined k + t − 1-clustering of P ′ from P by dividing one of the clusters of P, say P 1 , into t disjoint sets P 1,1 , P 1,2 , ..., P 1,t (while keeping all the other clusters of P unchanged). Note that although we are keeping clusters of P i unchanged for i > 1, their cluster centers b i (i > 1) might change because of k i=1 n i b i = 1. Therefore relating the optimizers of P to P ′ is not trivial.
Remark 4. Since P ′ is a refined version of P, the lower bound on W P ′ is expected. To intuitively understand the upper bound, note that a good clustering of P 1 puts valuation vectors that are geometrically close to each other into the same cluster. Therefore knowing that a person is in a certain cluster P 1,E for some E should provide some information about the geometrical location of the valuation vector of the person. Thus I(V 1 ; E) is large for a good clustering. However a large I(V 1 ; E) does not necessarily imply a good clustering. Such information theoretic interpretation of clustering (traditionally a topic of data mining and machine learning) may be new (we have not seen it) and it may be of independent interest. Remark 5. The distribution of p(v 1 ) is the empirical distribution of valuation vectors in P 1 and p(v 1 |E = e) is the empirical distribution of valuation vectors in P 1,e . I(V 1 ; E) is computable from these empirical distributions. Also, law of large number may be used to prove asymptotic statements.
Proof Outline: The equations showing up in the proof of this theorem resembles those showing up in the proof of Thm. 16.4.1 and 16.4.2 of [8] in the context of portfolio selection problem in i.i.d. stock markets. See [7] for the full proof. Note however that unlike the i.i.d. model considered in the portfolio problem, our model is not probabilistic at all; we are assuming that the valuation vectors of all individuals in the society are known deterministic vectors. Conceptually speaking in the i.i.d. portfolio model over n days, we have a temporal diversity of size n. This corresponds to an spatial diversity of n individuals in our model.
